4.4.3. Phase 3: “Tree” (DAO-Governed)
A properly ‘sheltered’ sapling would eventually grow into a tree — with deep roots, a sturdy trunk, and an adaptive metabolism (like dropping leaves come winter) to help it survive even on the harshest conditions.
Similarly, a web3 protocol at the “tree” phase would become a public good of sorts: a profitable “protocol model” with battle-tested smart contracts, paired with autonomous treasury operations and a working decentralized governance model. In the case of Reitio, this would mean the dissolution of the Reitio Foundation — in its wake, the ReitioDAO.
Delegates holding the keys to the protocol’s multisig accounts would be subjected to annual elections held by the ReitioDAO — the team would start as incumbents. Elected ‘protocol delegates’ would become the de-facto stewards of the protocol — responsible for code maintenance, distribution of developer grants, social media presence, partnerships, and other off-chain tasks or commitments.
Delegates holding the keys to the treasury’s multisig accounts would also be subjected to annual elections separate of the annual elections for ‘protocol delegates’. Elected ‘treasury delegates’ would become the de-facto stewards of the treasury — on a quarterly basis, they are responsible towards allocating funds pertinent to the compensation of ‘protocol delegates’ as well as for the protocol’s operating expenses (including authorizing additional financing for ad-hoc initiatives).
Upon the conclusion of election, the protocol would automatically revoke multisig access for leaving delegates — in its place, granting multisig access for incoming delegates.
This separation of powers create a system of checks and balances (an individual cannot be a ‘protocol delegate’ and a ‘treasury delegate’ at the same time) — comparable to the dynamics between the POTUS and Congress: the Congress can only enforce laws but not make them, while the POTUS can only make laws but not enforce them.
Likewise, treasury delegates cannot unilaterally enact changes to the protocol since they do not control the protocol’s multisig accounts, while protocol delegates must obtain approval from treasury delegates before they are given the necessary funds to execute C-level initiatives since they do not control the treasury’s multisig accounts.
Emergency delegate elections can be initiated by anyone in the event of fiduciary incompetence, and it will immediately go into effect once voter turnout reaches a certain threshold along with a supporting majority for the resolution. This ensures delegates, protocol or treasury, would always remain the best representative for the job notwithstanding any change to circumstances — one way or another as determined by the wider Reitio community.
Proposals to alter protocol parameters (ex: base fee, deployment and minting fees, etc.) would also need to be voted on by the ReitioDAO: upon passing of resolution, its actual implementation would be built-in within the proposal itself, meaning that Reitio's source code would automatically reflect the parameter changes without needing any party to guarantee its enforcement.
Treasury management would also remain automated: the amount of stablecoins on reserve would be based on how much capital that the protocol delegates have requested for the next quarter (pending approval from treasury delegates).
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